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1. Introduction
Standard growth literature assumes secure property rights. A large number of individuals
supply capital and labor and in exchange receive an income according to the marginal product
of these factors. Secure factor income is guaranteed by secure property rights, a reasonable
assumption for a fully developed economy situated in a democratic, constitutional state. A
less developed economy which is characterized by a high degree of social conflict, a low degree
of institutionalized or enforceable laws, or a high degree of political instability may be better
approximated by the assumption that secure property rights are absent. In this paper we
introduce missing property rights into two popular models of economic growth and compare
the results with the corresponding results from standard models. The comparison provides an
assessment of the importance of property rights for economic development and of the possible
gain from establishing secure property rights.
Empirical studies which include a proxy for insecure property rights usually find it negatively
correlated with economic growth, see e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1997), Scully (1988), Goldsmith (1995)
and Keefer and Knack (1997). In their survey article “Why not Africa?” Freeman and Lindauer
(1999) argue that missing property rights can be identified as the one major obstacle to growth
for Sub Saharan Africa. They conclude: “There is no single recipe for achieving economic
growth, but there is one way to prevent growth: through instability and absence of property
rights.” (p. 22).
In this paper we present a theoretical framework which supports the empirical evidence and
explains conditional convergence in simple models of economic growth. We show that an econ-
omy without property rights converges towards a different long-run state than an otherwise
identical economy with secure property rights. Individuals in an economy without property
rights choose a lower investment ratio and – depending on the given production technology –
approach either a lower level of consumption or a lower long-run growth rate than individuals in
an economy with secure property rights. Growth is conditioned on investment but investment
in turn is conditioned on the existence of property rights.
We model missing property rights by the assumption of a society of different groups in which
all groups have the right to invest and the right to expropriate. The groups play a dynamic game
of capital accumulation and expropriation. For a low number of groups we think of powerful
political or ethnic groups and for a high number of groups we think of a society close to anarchy.
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In Section 2 we set up the framework with a general production function and calculate Markovian
(sometime also called feedback-) Nash-strategies. In the remaining sections we introduce specific
forms of the production function and discuss the results.
The Nash-equilibrium is not the only available solution. Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) argue
that social norms may develop which enable two players to reach a Pareto-optimal equilibrium
using trigger strategies. This way they calculate an upper bound for growth without property
rights. Their approach can be understood as a complement to this paper where the Markovian
Nash-equilibrium characterizes the lower bound of what can go wrong when property rights are
absent.
In Section 3 we introduce missing property rights to the neoclassical growth model (Cass,
1965). A special two-player case of this game has a long history in the economic literature. It
is the game of capitalism as developed in Lancaster (1973) where one group has the right to
invest and bears the risk to be (partly) expropriated by the second group. The second group
in turn lacks the right to invest. Shimomura (1991) shows how to solve the game in feedback
strategies with nonlinear utility functions and convex technologies, which relates the game of
capitalism close to the neoclassical growth model without property rights. Hence, Section 3
can also be understood as a generalization of Shimomura’s game of capitalism. We show that
the existence or absence of property rights explains conditional convergence in levels. Starting
at the same initial state, individuals in an economy without property rights choose a lower
investment ratio and converge towards a lower steady-state consumption level. We combine
Shimomura’s analytical solution technique with the numerical solution technique of backward
integration (Brunner and Strulik, 2002). This enables us to identify explicitly the Markovian
Nash equilibrium in a calibrated growth model and to compute the welfare effects of establishing
secure property rights.
In the fourth section we calculate development dynamics when missing property rights are in-
troduced in a simple model of endogenous growth (Jones and Manuelli, 1990). First we consider
the effect of the number of competing groups on equilibrium growth and show that an increase in
the number of groups reduces the growth rate. Moreover, long-run growth in a Markovian equi-
librium could easily become negative while an otherwise identical economy with secure property
rights would grow at a positive rate. The result supports Freeman and Lindauers finding that
income per capita retrogressed in many Sub-Saharan countries with insecure property rights.
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We then demonstrate conditional convergence of growth rates: an economy without property
rights adjusts towards a steady-state of lower growth than an otherwise identical economy with
secure property rights. Conditional convergence arises because individuals in the economy with-
out property rights choose a lower investment ratio for any given capital productivity along the
adjustment path. Finally we numerically compute the growth and welfare effects of establishing
secure property rights.
The notation follows the presentation of the models with secure property rights in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995). In order to be brief, our analysis frequently refers to results displayed in
this widespread textbook of growth theory.
2. The General Framework
The economy is populated by n ≥ 2 homogenous groups. Each group i = 1, 2, . . . , n consists
of a continuum [0, 1] of agents with intertemporal utility of consumption, ci, according to
(1)
∫ ∞
0
c1−θi − 1
1− θ e
−ρtdt .
In (1) ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate and 1/θ > 0 the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
Using capital k ≥ 0 a single output is produced via a production function f . There exist no
property rights so that agents of each group are free to choose consumption and the evolution
of k is given by
(2) k˙ = f(k)− δk −
n∑
i=1
ci ,
where δ ≥ 0 denotes the rate of depreciation.
The production function f is twice continuously differentiable with f(0) = 0, f ′ > 0, f ′′ ≤ 0.
Given k(0) = k0 ≥ 0 agents maximize (1) with respect to (2) using a feedback Nash-strategy,
ci(k). Since all agents share symmetric utility functions and the same state equation, we confine
the analysis to Nash-equilibria in symmetric strategies:
(3) ci = c for i = 1, . . . , n .
We begin with constructing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for our differential game
by applying Theorem 6.16 of Basar and Olsder (1995).
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Theorem 2.1. If a continuously differentiable function V (k) can be found that satisfies
ρV (k) = (V ′(k)(θ−1)/θ − 1)/(1− θ) + V ′(k)[f(k)− δk − nV ′(k)−1/θ] ,(4)
subject to the boundary condition
lim
t→∞V (k(t)) exp[−ρt] = 0 ,(5)
where k(t) is the nonnegative solution to k˙ = f(k)− δk − nc(k), with k(0) = k0 and
c(k) = V ′(k)−1/θ ,(6)
then it generates a symmetric Markovian (feedback) Nash-equilibrium with the strategy of each
player defined by (6).
Proof. Using the Hamiltonian functions defined by
(7) Hi(k, c1, ..., cn, λi, t) :=
c1−θi − 1
1− θ exp[−ρt] + λi[f(k)− δk − c1 − ...− cn]
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations can be written as:
−∂Si(k, t)
∂t
= max
ci
Hi(k, c1(k, t), ..., ci, ..., cn(k, t),
∂
∂k
Si(k, t), t) ,
cj(k, t) = argmax
cj
Hj(k, c1(k, t), , , , , cj , ..., cn(k, t),
∂
∂k
Sj(k, t), t)(8)
for i, j = 1, ..., n with boundary conditions
(9) lim
t→∞Si(k(t), t) = 0, i = 1, ..., n ,
and k(t) ≥ 0 solves k˙ = f(k)− δk − c1(t)− ...− cn(t) with k(0) = k0.
If there are C1-functions S1(k, t), ..., Sn(k, t) which satisfy (8) and (9), then they generate a
feedback Nash-equilibrium by maximizing the Hamiltonians (8).
By setting S(k, t) = V (k) exp[−ρt] solving eqs. (8) and (9) simplifies to solving the following
system of ordinary differential equations:
ρVi(k) = max
ci
Hi(k, c1(k), ..., ci, ..., cn(k), V ′i (k), 0),(10)
cj(k) = argmax
cj
Hj(k, c1(k), ..., cj , ..., cn(k), V ′j (k), 0) ,(11)
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with boundary conditions
(12) lim
t→∞Vi(k(t)) exp[−ρt] = 0 .
Maximization of the Hamiltonians provides
(13) c−θi = V
′
i (k)⇔ ci = V ′i (k)−1/θ ,
and (10) can be rewritten as
(14) ρVi(k) = Hi(k, V ′1(k)
−1/θ, ..., V ′n(k)
−1/θ, V ′i (k), 0) .
For symmetric solutions, (12) and (14) simplify to
(15) ρV (k) = H(k, V ′(k)−1/θ, ..., V ′(k)−1/θ, V ′(k), 0) ,
(16) lim
t→∞V (k(t)) exp[−ρt] = 0 ,
which equals (4) and (5), and applying (13) provides (6). 
Theorem 2.2. Let c be a solution of
(17) c′(k) =
[f ′(k)− δ − ρ]c(k)
θ[f(k)− δk − nc(k)] + (n− 1)c(k) ,
with boundary condition
(18) lim
t→∞
∫ k(t)
k0
u′(c(y))dy exp[−ρt] = 0 ,
where k(t) is the corresponding non-negative state-trajectory of
k˙ = f(k)− δk − nc(k), k(0) = k0.
Then (c1, ..., cn) = (c, ..., c) constitutes a symmetric feedback Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. Let V (k) be defined as
V (k) :=
∫ k
k0
u′(c(y))dy + V (k0) ,(19)
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with V (k0) given by
V (k0) = (1/ρ){u(c0) + u′(c0)[f(k0)− δk0 − nc0]} .
We verify that V (k) is a solution to (4): Differentiating (4) with respect to k and substituting
u′(c) = V ′(k) and u′′(c)c′(k) = V ′′(k) provides (17). Equation (19) is obtained by integrating
(6). Insertion of V (k) into (4) using V ′(k0) = u′(c0) yields the initial value V (k0) and (18)
ensures that the transversality condition (5) holds. 
Since c′(k) = c˙/k˙, (17) can be decomposed into
c˙ = (f ′(k)− δ − ρ)c/θ ,(20)
k˙ = f(k)− δk − nc+ (n− 1)c/θ .(21)
The ordinary differential equation system (20) and (21) bear a striking resemblance to the
solution of the standard growth model. The decomposition provides two advantages which are
exploited throughout the remainder of the paper: The problem can be solved for c(k) with
standard methods and it can be easily compared to the solution of the corresponding model
with secure property rights. For these purposes, however, we have to specify the production
function.
3. Property Rights and Growth: The Neoclassical Case
The neoclassical production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type:
(22) f(k) = Akα , 0 < α < 1 , A > 0 .
Insertion of (22) in (20) and (21) provides
(23) c˙ = (αAkα−1 − δ − ρ)c/θ ,
(24) k˙ = Akα − δk − nc+ (n− 1)c/θ .
To assess the advantage of property rights we introduce an otherwise identical economy with
secure property rights. This is an economy with a large number of firms operating on compet-
itive markets and a continuum [0, n] of price-taking consumers which follow the Ramsey rule
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(23). The aggregate budget constraint is obtained after inserting (22) into (2).
Theorem 3.1. An economy with secure property rights converges towards the equilibrium
(25) kp = k? =
(
ρ+ δ
αA
)1/(α−1)
, cp =
Ak?α − δk?
n
The proof is in Cass (1965) and in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 2).
We confine the analysis to the case where the economy without property rights is initially
situated below the long-run equilibrium of an otherwise identical economy with secure property
rights: k(0) < k∗.
Theorem 3.2. If θ > (n − 1)/n, then an economy without property rights converges along a
unique path towards an equilibrium level of consumption which falls short of the consumption
level of an otherwise identical economy with secure property rights.
Proof. Step 1: For θ > (n− 1)/n system (23) and (24) has a unique positive equilibrium at
(26) k? =
(
ρ+ δ
αA
)1/(α−1)
, c? =
Ak?α − δk?
n− (n− 1)/θ .
The Jacobian determinant evaluated at c?, k? is det J = (n− (n−1)/θ)α(α−1)Ak?α−2c?/θ and
negative for θ > (n− 1)/n. The equilibrium is a saddlepoint.
Step 2: Figure 1 displays the phase diagram, where the k˙ = 0 locus of (24) is given by
(Akα − δk)/(n − (n − 1)/θ) and the c˙ = 0 locus is the vertical line at k?. All integral curves
except the stable manifold can be excluded for violating the transversality condition.
Let k1 denote the intersection of the stable manifold with the abscissa. Assume a capital
stock 0 < kc < k1 exists with c(kc) = 0. Let the point in time when this happens be denoted by
τ > 0. Then from (13) it follows that V ′i (k(τ)) =∞ and (d/dt)(V ′i (k)) = V ′′i (k)k˙ < 0 for k < k∗
so that V ′i (k(t)) > V
′
i (k(τ)) for all t < τ which is a contradiction to V
′
i (k(τ)) being infinite.
Therefore, the stable manifold goes through the origin.
Step 3: The equilibrium of the economy is situated where the stable manifold intersects the
real k˙ = 0 locus obtained from (2) with (22) as c˜(k) = (Akα − δk)/n with
(27) c′ =
αAkα−1 − δ − ρ
n− 1 ,
at the intersection. Since c? > cp, consumption at an intersection k?? falls short of cp, c?? < cp.
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Suppose there are multiple intersections k? > k1 > k2 > . . .. The stable manifold is located
above the c˜(k)-curve at k? so that at k1:
c′(k1) > c˜′(k1) ⇔ αAk
α−1
1 − δ − ρ
n− 1 >
αAkα−11 − δ
n
⇔ αAkα−11 > δ + nρ ,
Hence, at k2:
c′(k2) < c˜′(k2) ⇔ αAk
α−1
2 − δ − ρ
n− 1 <
αAkα−12 − δ
n
⇔ αAkα−12 < δ + nρ ,
and therefore αAkα−12 < δ + nρ < αAk
α−1
1 , which contradicts the assumption k1 > k2. Hence,
if an equilibrium exists, it is unique.
It remains to prove that a positive intersection exists. Since c(k) is situated below the k˙ = 0
locus of (24), (Akα − δk − nc) + (n− 1)c/θ > 0 for k ∈ (0, k?) and hence
(28) c′ =
(αAkα−1 − δ − ρ)c
θ(Akα − δk − nc) + (n− 1)c <
(αAkα−1 − δ)c
θ(Akα − δk − nc) + (n− 1)c .
for k ∈ (0, k?). Suppose c(k) > c˜(k) for k ∈ (0, k?). Then there exists an  > 0,  < k? so that
c′ =
(αAkα−1 − δ − ρ)c
θ(Akα − δk − nc) + (n− 1)c > c˜
′ =
αAkα−1 − δ
n
for k ∈ (0, ) and (28) implies
(αAkα−1 − δ)c
θ(Akα − δk − nc) + (n− 1)c >
αAkα−1 − δ
n
for k ∈ (0, ). Since αAkα−1 − δ > 0 for k ∈ (0, ) it follows that
c
θ(Akα − δk − nc) + (n− 1)c >
1
n
for k ∈ (0, ), and taking the limit
lim
k→0
c
θ(Akα − δk − nc) + (n− 1)c =
1
n(1− θ)− 1 ≥
1
n
,
which is a contradiction since the left hand side of the inequality condition is negative for
θ > (n− 1)/n.
Hence, a unique positive equilibrium k?? < k? exists.
Step 4: Because c?? and k?? are positive and constant, the transversality condition (18) is
fulfilled. 
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Figure 1: Phase Diagram – Neoclassical Growth
  


 	
   


	 
 ﬀ
ﬁﬃﬂ   ﬃ! " #$&%
'
(
)*ﬃ+, -
.
/10 23
The condition for existence of a Markovian Nash-equilibrium requires that θ exceeds one half
when there are two competing groups and one for n → ∞. Since estimation results as well as
rules of thumb suggest that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ = 1/θ, is well below
one, the condition is a very mild one.1
The question remains whether the absence of property rights does significantly affect the per-
formance of a developing economy. This question can only be answered numerically. Therefore,
we parameterize the model and determine adjustment dynamics and steady-state consumption
by means of backward integration (Brunner and Strulik, 2002).
In the first step we compute the stable manifold of (23) and (24) and obtain a numerical
solution for the Nash-strategy c(k). Let  denote a small positive number close to the smallest
computable number on the computer. Starting in k? − , c? −  we integrate the parameterized
system (23) and (24) backwards in time using k = k0 as termination criterion. Hence, we replace
the inherently unstable boundary value problem by an inherently stable initial value problem
which can be solved easily and accurately with standard methods2. WithM denoting the number
of executed integration steps the procedure provides a list of values for k and c and after reverting
them we get the forward looking list of values ((kj)Mj=1, (cj)
M
j=1) with (kM , cM ) ≈ (k?, c?). From
1See Hall (1988) and Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), see Ogaki et el. (1996) for estimates of σ for developing countries.
One could argue that interpreting powerful groups as rich oligarchs shifts the range of possible values upwards,
since it has been shown that σ increases in wealth levels. Evidence for elasticities above one, however, is lacking.
In a panel analysis Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) estimate a σ around 0.8 for the richest Indian households.
2We have used MATLAB’s ODE45.
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this list we use the first m elements, ((kj)mj=1, (cj)
m
j=1) with f(km) − δkm − ncm ≈ 0 so that
(km, cm) is an approximation for the equilibrium of (2).
In the second step we use the real equation of motion obtained from (2) and (22) as g(k) =
Akα − δk − nc and calculate the real time paths by setting t = 0 at k0 and integrating
tj+1 − tj =
∫ k(j+1)
k(j)
1/g(k)dk
for the i = 1, . . . ,m− 1. For that purpose we employ the trapezoidal rule.
We compare the result with the outcome in an otherwise identical economy with secure prop-
erty rights, for which the time paths are also obtained by means of backward integration.
Figure 2 shows the result for some frequently used parameters in calibration of growth models
(as described below the figure). Solid lines represent the economy without property rights
and dashed lines are the standard result for an economy with secure property rights. Both
economies begin their development at the same initial state where k0 = 0.3kp. The first panel
shows consumption measured in terms of steady–state consumption under secure property rights.
Without property rights people consume more in the first years as compared to people in an
economy with secure property rights. Since the capital stock is far below its steady-state level
individuals in the economy with secure property choose high investment ratios at the beginning
of the transition (I/Y in the middle panel). Without property rights, however, people bear
the risk of being expropriated and investment ratios are comparatively low even when capital
productivity is high. Low investment implies slow growth along the adjustment path (capital
growth rate γk in the right panel) and convergence towards a lower long-run consumption level
of about 80 percent of an economy with secure property rights.
Table 1 compares consumption and welfare for a variety of alternative parameters of the
model. The first row shows steady-state consumption per capita without property rights rel-
ative to consumption in an otherwise identical economy with secure property rights. Relative
consumption decreases sharply in the number of competing groups. If there are only two com-
peting groups people may end up with about 80 percent of consumption of an economy with
secure property rights. The arrival of a third group, however, reduces this ratio to about 65
percent. If we consider n → ∞ as anarchy, population converges to starvation when society
converges towards anarchy. This can also be seen from Figure 1 and (26) –(27). An increasing
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Figure 2: Adjustment Dynamics: Neoclassical Growth
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number of competing groups shifts c? downwards and increases c′ at the intersection point k??
thereby reducing c??.
TABLE 1
Relative Economic Performance Without Property Rights:
Neoclassical Growth Model
Basic Scenarioa ρ = 0.03 θ = 1 θ = 4 α = 0.4 δ = 0.05 n = 3 n = 5 n=10
Consumption 81 78 65 88 79 76 65 45 25
Welfare 23 27 54 14 26 31 54 120 296
Welfare Gain 13 13 37 6 14 13 34 81 205
Consumption is the steady-state level of consumption without property rights relative to steady-state
consumption with secure property rights, Welfare is the corresponding steady-state welfare differential,
Welfare Gain is the gain from establishing secure property rights. Numbers in percent and rounded.
a α = 0.36, A = 1, ρ = 0.02, θ = 2, δ = 0.1.
The intuition for the result is that the market share (i.e. power) of a group decreases in n. An
increasing number of competing groups increases the possibility of being exploited and hence
reduces the incentive to invest. This can be seen by comparing capital productivities. For the
basic parameterization the steady-state interest rate is 2 percent in an economy with secure
property rights and equates the net marginal productivity of capital. In contrast, net marginal
capital productivity is 7.9 percent in an economy without property rights and two competing
groups. Generally, the result can be used to explain why investment is low although the capital
stock is underdeveloped and capital productivity is high. Starting at the same initial state,
individuals in an economy without property rights choose a lower initial investment ratio and
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converge towards a lower steady-state consumption level. Hence the model explains conditional
convergence in levels, where the condition is the existence of secure property rights.
The second row shows the implied difference in welfare in percent between both economies at
the steady-state and the last row shows the welfare gain of establishing secure property rights.
It consists of the steady-state welfare difference and a temporary welfare loss since people invest
more and consume less during the first phase of transition towards the new equilibrium. For an
assessment it is helpful to recall some other welfare effects presented in the economics literature.
For example, the welfare gain of replacing distortionary capital taxation (Lucas, 1990) and
the welfare gain of reducing inflation from ten percent to zero (Lucas, 2000) are estimated
to be around one percent. The welfare gain of eliminating business cycles is calculated to be
0.05 percent (Lucas, 1987). Against these magnitudes, the welfare gain of establishing secure
property rights is huge. It is around 13 percent in the basic scenario for two groups and increases
sharply in the number of competing groups.
4. Growth and Development Dynamics
The easiest way to introduce the potential for perpetual growth would be the assumption of
a linear production technology. As it is well-known from the corresponding model with secure
property rights, under such a technology growth is constant at all times. Insecure property
rights, however, are usually considered as a phenomenon of developing countries and it seems
more appropriate to analyze them in a growth model capable of displaying adjustment dynam-
ics. In this section we therefore combine the Ak model with the neoclassical growth model by
introducing a convex growth technology:3
(29) f(k) = Ak +Bkα, A,B > 0 , 0 < α < θ.
The model for a competitive economy with secure property rights has first been presented in
Jones and Manuelli (1990). Our discussion is related to the textbook presentation in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995). The advantage of having transitional dynamics is that we can derive
conditional convergence of growth rates, where the condition is the existence of secure property
rights.
3Lane and Tornell (1996) have investigated missing property rights in a linear growth model with a special focus
on the so-called voracity effect i.e. parameter constellations where positive exogenous shocks lead to lower long-
run growth. In the discussion below a sufficiently small intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/θ according to
condition (33) excludes the voracity effect.
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Since the growing economy has no steady-state in c and k, we first introduce the consumption
capital ratio χ = c/k as control-like variable and the output capital ratio as z = f(k)/k as
state-like variable. Note that z ≥ A for k ≥ 0.
Again, we first summarize the behavior of an economy with secure property rights populated
by a continuum [0, n] of price taking consumers.
Theorem 4.1. If
(30) ϕ =
[
θ − 1
θ
(A− δ) + ρ
θ
]
> 0 ,
(31) A− δ > ϕ⇔ A− δ > ρ ,
then an economy with secure property rights develops along a unique adjustment path towards
the saddlepoint equilibrium at χ = ϕ/n, z = A with constant positive growth at rate
(32)
c˙
c
=
k˙
k
= (1/θ)(A− δ − ρ) .
The proof is in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Ch. 4.5.1.
Theorem 4.2. If an economy with secure property rights has a unique path of positive growth,
and if
(33) θ >
n− 1
n
,
(34) A− δ > ϕ θn
nθ − (n− 1) ⇔
A− δ
n
> ρ ,
then an otherwise identical economy without property rights has a unique adjustment path to-
wards the equilibrium
(35) χ? = ϕ
θ
nθ − (n− 1) ,
(36) z? = A .
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where the economy grows at constant rate
(37)
c˙
c
=
k˙
k
=
A− δ − ρn
nθ − (n− 1) .
Proof. Step 1: Using (29) system (20) and (21) can be rewritten in state-like-control-like notation
as
(38) z˙ = (α− 1)(z −A)
[
z − δ − nθ − (n− 1)
θ
χ
]
,
(39) χ˙ = χ
[
−θ − α
θ
(z −A)− ϕ+ nθ − (n− 1)
θ
χ
]
.
Since we have assumed that θ > α, conditions (33) and (34) ensure that a unique positive
equilibrium for z ≥ A exists. It is located at χ?, z?. The Jacobian determinant of (38) and (39)
evaluated at the equilibrium is ϕ(α− 1)(A− δ−ϕ) and hence negative from (33) and (34). The
equilibrium is a saddlepoint. Figure 3 shows the (relevant part of the) phase diagram.
We next show that the transversality condition (18) is fulfilled. Using χ = c/k, it follows that∫ k
k0
u′(c(y))dy =
∫ k
k0
u′(yχ(y))dy.
Since χ converges, it is bounded and with χ˙ < 0 the minimum can be written as
χ∗ = min{χ(t), t ∈ [0,∞)} > 0.
With u′′ < 0 it follows that∫ k
k0
u′(yχ(y))dy ≤
∫ k
k0
u′(yχ∗)dy = (χ∗)−θ
∫ k
k0
y−θdy.
Integration by substitution provides∫ k(t)
k(0)
y−θdy =
∫ t
0
k(s)−θk˙(s)ds ≤
∫ t
0
k(s)−θ−1(z0 − δ − nχ∗)ds,
since z˙ < 0.
From γk := k˙/k = A + Bkα−1 − δ − nχ it follows that γ˙k = B(α − 1)kα−2 − nχ˙ < 0 and
therefore k(t) ≥ k0 exp(γ∗t) with γ∗ = A− δ − nχ∗.
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Equation (18) can now be rewritten as
lim
t→∞
∫ k
k0
u′(c(y))dy exp[−ρt] ≤ const ∗ lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
k(s)−θ−1ds exp[−ρt].
≤ const ∗ lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
{k0 exp[(A− δ − ϕ nθ
nθ − (n− 1))s]}
−(θ+1)ds exp[−ρt]
= const ∗ lim
t→∞ exp[−((A− δ − ϕ
nθ
nθ − (n− 1))(θ + 1)− ρ)t],
which equals zero because (34) guarantees that
−(A− δ − ϕ nθ
nθ − (n− 1))(θ + 1)− ρ < 0.
Hence, limt→∞
∫ k
k0 u
′(c(y))dy exp[−ρt] = 0 because with increasing k(t), the integral cannot
become negative.
Figure 3: Phase Diagram: Endogenous Growth Without Property Rights
 


	




  
 
Step 2: It remains to prove that the consumption strategy χ(z) is compatible with positive
long-run growth. After insertion of (29) into (2) the real growth rate of the economy is obtained
in state-like control-like notation as γk = z − δ − nχ. For positive growth the χ(z) curve must
be situated below the real k˙/k = 0-locus
(40) χ˜(z) = (z − δ)/n .
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Since χ˜(z?) = (A − δ)/n, condition (34) ensures that χ lies below the k˙/k = 0-locus at the
equilibrium. The k˙/k = 0-curve is linear with slope 1/n.
Assume χ(z) has intersections with the k˙/k = 0-locus for z > A. With (38), (39) and (40),
the slope χ′(z) = χ˙/z˙ at the intersection points is given by
χ′(z) =
− θ−αθ (z −A)− ϕ+ nθ−(n−1)θn (z − δ)
(α− 1)(z −A)n−1θ
.
Let the intersection point closest to z? for z > A be denoted by z1. Then the slope of χ(z) in
z1 has to be larger than 1/n: χ′(z1) > 1/n. This leads to the inequality
z1 <
A
[
(1− α)n−1nθ − θ−αθ
]
+ ϕ+
[
nθ−(n−1)
nθ
]
δ
α/(nθ)
.
Inserting ϕ this simplifies to
z1 <
A(α− 1) + δ + nρ
α
< A ,
where the last inequality follows from (34) . This is a contradiction to the assumption z1 > A.
Finally, insertion of (29) and (35) in (2) provides (37) and condition (34) has to hold for
positive growth. 
Let us first consider the steady-state growth path.
Theorem 4.3. There exists a set of feasible parameter specifications for A, δ, ρ, θ, n which
enables an economy with secure property rights to grow forever but not an otherwise identical
economy without property rights. The possibility for this scenario increases with the number of
groups.
Proof. Conditions (31) and (34) have to hold for positive growth with secure property rights and
without property rights, respectively. Condition (34) can always be violated by a sufficiently
large n, whereas (31) is independent from n. 
In an economy with secure property rights net capital productivity A − δ has to be larger
than the time-preference rate for long-run growth to be possible. This is not enough for pos-
itive growth without property rights. There, net capital productivity divided by the number
of competing groups must exceed the time-preference rate. In other words, if there are two
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competing groups and no property rights capital productivity has to be twice as large as under
secure property rights to trigger sufficient investment for positive growth in the long-run.
Theorem 4.4. If an economy is capable of long-run growth without property rights then growth
in an otherwise identical economy with secure property rights is higher. The difference in growth
rates is given by
(41) ∆γ = ϕ
n− 1
nθ − (n− 1) ,
which is increasing in the number of competing groups.
Proof. Substraction of (37) from (32) provides (41). The difference increases in n since ∂(∆γ)/∂n =
θ [1− n/1− θ)]−2 > 0. 
TABLE 2
Relative Economic Performance Without Property Rights:
Endogenous Growth Model
Basic Scenarioa θ = 1 θ = 4 A = 0.18b ρ = 0.03 n = 3 n = 4 n=5
Growth (∆γ) 1.33 2.00 0.70 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 8.00
c/k 133 198 114 133 133 150 160 167
Welfare Gain 12 35 6 12 12 33 – –
∆γ is the steady-state difference of growth rates according to (41), c/k is the steady-state consumption
capital ratio relative to secure property rights, Welfare Gain is the gain from establishing secure property
rights. Numbers in percent and rounded.
a A = 0.16, ρ = 0.02, θ = 2, δ = 0.1. These parameters imply equilibrium growth gC
∗ = 0.02 under secure
property rights, a implies gC
∗ = 0.03
The question remains whether the absence of property rights lowers economic growth sig-
nificantly. For that purpose we calculate growth rates for parameterized economies with and
without property rights. We take the parameter values from Table 1 and adjust A so that the
economy with secure property rights generates an equilibrium growth rate of two percent. The
results are presented in Table 2. The first row shows the difference of growth rates according
to (41). In the basic scenario the economy with secure property rights grows at two percent
while the economy without property rights grows at a rate of only 0.67 percent. Generally, we
observe that the relative performance of an economy without property rights is worse than in
the neoclassical economy from the previous section. If only two competing groups exist, the
growth rate is about one third of an economy with secure property rights. If n rises up to three
the economy without property rights stagnates. A slightly further increase of n may already
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produce disaster. The – Symbol in Table 2 indicates that although a Markovian equilibrium
exists it implies a negative growth rate. Hence these economies converge towards the origin and
the welfare gain of establishing secure property rights is infinitely large.
The second row shows that the inferior performance without property rights results from an
excessively high consumption ratio. (in the basic scenario 133 percent of the consumption ratio
under secure property rights). In other words, although the capital stock is much lower, and
capital productivity is much higher, investment is too low to generate satisfying economic growth.
If the number of groups exceeds three, investment is too low to support long-run existence of the
economy. The welfare gain from establishing secure property rights is presented in the last row.
Again, the welfare gain is huge and – when it is computable – in order of magnitude comparable
to the welfare gain computed for the neoclassical economy.
Figure 4: Development Dynamics: Endogenous Growth
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n = 2, α = 0.3, A = 0.25, B = 1, θ = 4, ρ = 0.02.
Now consider development dynamics with and without property rights. We use the basic
scenario from Table 2 (and B = 1, α = 0.36) and employ the method of backward integration.
The integration is terminated at z = 1, i.e. at a capital output ratio of one, which may represent
a less developed country. After having obtained the stable manifold and reverting the solution
sequence to forward looking we calculate the real adjustment path by employing the trapezoidal
rule and the real growth rate γk = z − δ − 2χ (see Section 3 for details). We compare the
development path to the solution for an otherwise identical economy with secure property rights.
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In Figure 4 solid lines show adjustment dynamics without property rights and dashed lines the
corresponding development path with secure property rights. Without property rights people
choose a higher consumption capital ratio (χ) during the adjustment process and in the long–
run. As a result, they arrive at a steady-state of permanently lower growth in capital and
consumption. Although both economies show the same (gross) capital productivity (A− δ), the
investment ratio (I/K = z − nχ) is higher in the economy with secure property rights where
the consumption ratio χ is lower.
In conclusion, the simple convex model of growth can be employed to explain conditional
convergence. The condition is the existence of secure property rights. If preferences and tech-
nology allow for long-run growth, insecure property rights lead to a lower rate of investment and
adjustment dynamics towards a steady-state of lower growth compared to an otherwise identical
economy with secure property rights. However, the analysis has also shown that long-run growth
is not necessarily positive. For a wide range of parameter values income per capita retrogresses
without secure property rights while it would grow perpetually if property rights were secure.
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